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ABSTRACT
This study uses several data sets on individual workers to analyse
the impact of unionism on the length of attachment between workers and firms.
It finds that unionism substantially raises tenure and reduces probabilities
of separation. The increase in worker attachment to firms resulting from
unionism is not due largely to monopoly wage increases nor to reductions in
employer-initiated separations nor to unionization of more stable workers,
but rather to changes in worker behavior induced by unionised work settings.
Among the work place conditions that appear to raise tenure with a firm are
the presence of grievance systems and specific work rules like seniority.
These findings provide some support for the 'exit-voice' model of
the union and for the traditional industrial relations view of unionism as a
complex institution which causes wide-ranging changes in the job market. They
suggest that modern empirical research on trade unionism which currently
focuses almost exclusively on estimating monopoly wage effects, should be
extended to analyse the non-monopoly wage voice or industrial jurisprudence
impacts of unions. Unions have monopoly wage effects, but they also have more
subtle, potentail1y socially beneficial economic effects that deserve attention.
Ricahrd B. Freeman
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 868-3915The nature and length of the attachment between workers and enter-
prises is one of the most important aspects of the work relation in
modern industrial economies. Workers with long job tenure and relatively
permanent status in firms are treated differently and behave differently
than short term or temporary employees. Tenurel in a firm is an important
determinant of wages, fringe benefits, promotions, layoffs, and quits.
It differentiates persons in the internal labor market from those in
the external markets and workers likely to have firm specific human
capital from those without such capital. In the unionized sector,
work rules relating to seniority make length of attachment between workers
and firms a key factor in the economic well-being of employees.
Despite widespread recognition of the importance of tenure in the
labor market and of the particular significance of seniority in unionized
settings, empirical work on the impact of unionism on the length of
attachment between workers and enterprises has been relatively sparse.
The labor turnover literature has concentrated on the effect of specific
human capital on turnover and has been limited to analysis of aggregate
manufacturing data, which provides only weak evidence on the behavior of
individuals and covers only one-fifth of the labor force. While several
analysts have found an inverse relation between unionism and quit rates in
the aggregate data, others have not, leading to what some regard as
inconclusive results. 2 The bulk of the economic literature on unions deals
with union wage effects and not with the impact of the institution on
nonwage variables like tenure with a firm.
What is the relation between unionism and tenure? Does trade unionism
increase length of attachment between firms and employees and, if so, by
what routes or mechanisms?2
This study examines these important questi:)ns using newly available
data files on individuals, which contain information on their job tenure
and union status, among other things. Section one examines the theoretical
reasons for expecting unionism to increase job tenure. Section two develops
the "waiting time" statistics and econometrics needed to analyze tenure
and its converse, separations. Section three describes the data sets under
study and presents the basic econometric analysis of the effect of unionism
on tenure and separations. Section four analyzes the routes by which
unionism influences the variables. The paper concludes with a brief
discussion of the implications of the analysis for understanding the
economic effects of unionism.
There are three basic findings:
1. Trade unionism is significantly positively related to the length
of attachment between workers and firms, making union wad: forces much more
likely to be relatively "permanent" than nonunion work forces.
2. Unionism influences the length of attachment by reducing the
quit rate of workers, not by reducing the layoff or discharge rate of
firms.
3. The impact of unionism on worker quit behavior is not due primarily
to union wage gains nor to selectivity of more stable workers but to
actual changes in behavior induced by union work settings. Some of
these changes may be attributed to the grievance/arbitration system and
some to inverse seniority layoff rules.
Overall, by raising the length of attachment between workers and
firms, unionism appears to alter the operation of the labor ~arket in
an important way that is often neglected in standard studies of union
monopoly wage gains.
I. Unionism and Job Tenure
Because employment is a two-sided arrangement, dependent on the3
decisions of firms and workers, spells of job tenure result from the joint
behavior of employers, who decide whether or not to retain a worker, and
employees, who moose to stay or go. The basic principal for maintaining
the employment relation is that neither side can do better in the outside
market or, given uncertainty, that neither expects to do better. Let
W= compensation at the current enterprise, including nonpecuniary
components of pay; A = compensation at alternative jobs, also including
nonpecuniary rewards; and MP = marginal product at the enterprise. Then
the employment relation will be maintained in period t when:
(1) MP > W > A
t - t - t
If At > W t , the worker can do better elsewhere and will break the relation
by quitting. If W t > MPt , the employer loses money by keeping the worker
and will lay him or her off. If there are no costs involved in altering
the contract, so that the wage rises or falls within the bounds of At and
MPt , the relation will continue as long as MPt
~ At' that is, as long as
the social value of the arrangement exceeds the social cost. If, as
seems reasonable, decisions to leave are essentially irreversible,
the terms in (1) are best thought of as representing the present values
of the relevant variables.
Trade unionism can be expected to influence the benefits and costs
of the length of spells of employment in three distinct ways.
First, in the context of the standard monopoly model of unionism,
union-induced increases in wages and related pecuniary rewards are likely
to raise the benefits to employees of staying on the job and thus to
lower worker-initiated separationa Since union wage gains have been
found to be sizeable (see Lewis) and high wages are likely to reduce
quits significantly, the "monopoly wage" route of union impact on job
tenure may be quite potent. To the extent that union wage increases
reduce employment, the union work force is likely to be smaller but more4
stable than otherwise comparable nonunion work forces.
Second, unionism creates distinctive "voice" mechanisms for resolving
industrial relations problems that can also be expected to lower worker-
initiated separations. Perhaps the most important such institution is
the grievance/arbitration system, which offers dissatisfied workers who
might consider quitting an al.ternative means of expressing discontent and possibly
changing undesirQble work conditions. Nearly all (9970) major u.S. collective
bargaining contracts provide for grievance and 95% provide for arbitration
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1977, p. 94). The potential impact of grievance/
arbitration on length of attachment to an employer is clear: workers who
believe they have been unfairly treated or who believe their supervisors
erred in interpreting work rules will seek a solution through the grievance
procedure before invoking the drastic remedy of quitting. If the grievance
is successful, the incentive to quit will be removed. Even if it is not
and the aggrieved ultimately leaves, the delay in the quit decision during
the grievance procedure will raise average spells of tenure.3
The regular process of collective negotiation of labor contracts
can also be expected to reduce exit behavior. Workers wanting new conditions
who, in the absence of a bargaining alternative, might have quit will
instead seek first to obtain the particular changes through bargaining.
If some of the worker demands are met, quits are likely to be lower than
would otherwise be the case. For work conditions and rules that are
"public" to the enterprise, where standard public goods arguments suggest
that enterprises have great difficulty in eliciting true worker preferences,
considerable mobility would be needed for these conditions and rules to
be provided. Here the role of unionism in obtaining and aggregating
preferences might produce the desired arrangements more efficiently,
surely with lower mobility in the market.5
Union "voice" may also reduce worker-initiated separations by
creating particular work rules and conditions of employment (which mayor
may not be costly to employers, once unionism is "in place") that are
desired by workers, particularly what industrial relations experts call
the industrial jurisprudence system. Under this system many work
place decisions are made on the basis of negotiated rules, for instance
seniority, as opposed to supervisory judgment (or whim). By straightforward
application of compensating differential arguments, if workers desire these
conditions and if they are provided largely by unions, then with pay and other
pecuniary benefits hel'l fixed, separation rates should be lower for union
workers.
Third, unionism may affect employer-initiated separations, discharges
and layoffs. Discharges are likely to be more expensive in union settings
due to explicit rules protecting job rights and the possibility of protesting
discharges through the grievance system. The tendency of arbitrators to
view discharge of senior employees as an extreme penalty in discipline
cases to be used only as a last resort reduces the chance of dismissal in
an organized plant.
The effect of unions on layoffs, however, is more complex. On the
one hand, union-induced increases in wages may cause unionized establishments
to go out of business, reducing average spells of tenure among the organized.
On the other hand, unionized firms have inverse seniority layoff rules
and seniority recall rules which lead to extensive use of temporary
layoffs and recalls over the business cycle (Medoff), maintaining employment
relations. Whether the net of union effects on discharges, permanent
layoffs and temporary layoffs is to increase or reduce employer-initiated
separations and thus job tenure is unclear.
In addition to the behavioral impacts of unionism outlined above,6
union workers may accrue more job tenure than other workers for very differ-
ent "selectivity" reasons. If, as seems reasonable, unions organize workers
or firms that are innately more stable, unionised employees will have longer
spells of job tenure than nonunion employees in the absence of any changes
in behavior. Such selectivity in organization is likely if workers view
unionisation" as a longterm investment, which pays off for those with rela-
tively permanent careers in an establishment but which is unlikely to be
worth the organizing effort for those with short-term employment expectations.
The selectivity effect differs fundamentally from the behavioral effects.
If it is the sole cause of differences between union and nonunion workers,
then unions have no real impact on behavior but merely sort out more and less
stable workers. It is clearly important to control for the potential impact
of selectivity bias in any analysis of union effects on tenure.
Empirical efforts to estimate the effect of unionism on job tenure
must control for other L~portant economic variables likely to influence
lengths of spells of employment: investments in skills that are
specific to an enterprise; complementarities in production and the
"tendency for men with particular qualities to move towards those
employers who can best make use of their qualities" (Hicks, p. 37),
particularly in team settings; costs of mobility on the workers
side and of recruitment and training on the employers side.
Considerable effort has gone into measuring some of these factors and into
estimating their effect on rates of separation, though not on job tenure
itself (see Parsons). For purposes of the present study, these variables
are treated as:controls to isolate the impact of unionism.
II Statistical Issues
From the perspective of probability theory, job tenure is best
. , .7
viewed as a "waiting time" variable whose length depends on the probability
P that an employment relation ends in a given period and the probability
l-P that it is maintained in the period. In this section I review briefly
some of the basic statistics of waiting time relations and consider their
relevance for econometric analysis of the effects of unionism. There are
three technical issues: the 'functional form of tenure equations: and of
their counterpart, separation equations; differences between completed and
incomplete spells of tenure; and the problem of differentiating behavioral
effects from selectivity.
Functional form
The appropriate functional form for an equation explaining tenure
depends on the, specific probability model and "hazard function" governing
the probability that an employee separates from a job in a given period.
The simplest and most manageable model assumes that each individual/
job has a constant probability of separation (p) in a given period,
dependent on the economic forces described earlier, but not on accrued
tenure. With a constant probability P and a discrete time model, the
probability of accruing t years of tenure is:
(2)
t
peT = t) = P(l-P)
a geometric distribution with mean (l-P)/P and standard deviation (l-P)/P.
The continuous equivalent of (2) is the exponential, with density function:
(3) f(t) = P exp(-Pt)
and a mean and standard deviation of lip, where P is the separation rate.
The dependence of P on a set of economic variables (X.) can be
~
represented by a linear probability function or, more properly.because P
is bounded by 0 and l, by the logistic function:
(4) P = 1/(1 + exp EB.X.)
i ~ ~
The logistic can be estimated by a maximum likelihood search procedure.8
Given (3) and (4) the expected value of tenure conditional on the
X's and on an error term in the equation for P is an exponential function:
(5) E(T/X;,ll.) = exp -EB.X. + E(l.1.)
... .... i ~ ~ ~
Equation (5) can be estimated by maximum ·likelihood. Since, however,
one cannot be sure that P is independent of past tenure nor logistic in form,
it may be J1lOre reasonable to evaluate the effect of variables on tenure in
regression analysis by taking a linear function:
(6) T = -EB.X. + 1.1.
~ ~ ~
The linear equation can be viewed as a first order Tayler series approximation
to the exponential or to more complex forms.
When P depends on the level of cumulated service, the geometric
or exponential forms are no longer appropriate. The functional form of
the tenure equation will depend on the link between past tenure and
the probability of separatio~which can be quite complex. The principal
tool for analyzing tenure in this case is the haz.ard function. The hazard
function h(x) is a conditional density measuring the probability or
frequency of separations conditional on past tenure:
(7) h(x) = f(x)/ (l-F(x»
exponential function. The geometric and exponential distributions have,
as noted, constant hazard functions, which makes their mean levels of tenure
depend directly on fue probability of separation. Distributions with
increasing or decreasing hazard functions do not, unfortunately, generate
4 simple equations linking tenure to explanatory variables. To evaluate9
the impact of variables on tenure in such distributions, linear equations
(e.g. (6» or logarithmic (log T = -rB.X.) equations can be estimated, on the
1 1
assumption that those forms are first-order Taylor's series approximations to
more complex functions. To obtain insight into the shape of the hazard function
itself--the extent to which tenure affects the probability of separation--
it is best to estimate the separation equation (4) with past tenure
included as an independent variable, rather than to infer shares from
the tenure equations.
Incomplete vs. Completed Spells
Surveys of individuals typically ask persons the number of years of
job tenure at a point in time and thus contain information on incomplete
spells of tenure rather than on the completed spells that -are the
dependent variable of renewal theory. In general, the mean of the distribution
of incomplete spells will not equal the mean of the completed spell distribution.
On the one hand, since spells are not complete, tenure will increase as
time proceeds, which implies that the mean incomplete spell will be
smaller than the mean completed spell. On the other hand, at any point in time
longer spells are more likely to be represented in a sample than shorter spells,
raising the mean o£ incomplete spells. Only in the case of a constant
(memory-less). separation propensity such as in the binomial or geometric
distributions do the two biases cancel out, making the mean of the incomplete
spell equal the mean of the completed spell. When, as one would expect,
the separatiun rate drops as tenure rises (h' < 0), the mean of the
incomplete spell distribution will exceed that of the completed spell distribution,
leading to an overstatement of the average duration of spells of job tenure.10
The fact that the distribution of incomplete spells does not generally
have the same mean as the distribution of completed spells does not, however,
imply that it is incorrect to analyze incomplete spells. With a stationary
stochastic process generating separations, both the incomplete and completed
spell distributions embody the same information. They are simply different
representations of the particular stochastic process and can be readily
transformed from one to the other.5 Whether one wishes to focus on the
incomplete spell distribution or the distribution of completed spells is
a matter of choice.
In this study I examine lengths of incomplete tenure
among persons rather than lengths of co~pleted spells. Average
tenure refers to the average length of years an individual has been
with an employer at a point in time, not the length of an average completed
spell. Inferences about completed spells can be made from estimates of
separation equations or, alternatively, from the analysis of incomplete
spells, given the appropriate transformation between them.
Selectivity vs. Behavioral Effects
As pointed out in section I, relations between unionism and job tenure
obtained in cross-sectional data can be interpreted either as a result of
the influence of unions on behavior or as a result of the organization of
innately more stable employees. The easiest way of differentiating between
these two effects and isolating the behavioral aspect of unionism of
concern is to examine longitudinal data on the behavior of the same
person over time. With information on the same person over time one can11
compare the person's behavior when he is unionized and when he is not.
By comparing the same person in the two situations, one eliminates the
unobserved personal propensity to be a stable worker and thus isolates
the behavioral impact of unionism.
The use.of longitudinal data to control for unobserved personal factors can
be most readily demonstrated with a linear probability model of the worker's quit
deci~ion. Let Qit = 0-1 dummy variable which measures whether the ith
person quits in period t; UNit = 0-1 dummy variable for whether or not the
person is a union member; h = unobserved personal characteristics which
i
raises the propensity to quit; and eit be a residual uncorrelated with
unionism. For simplicity, the effect of other variables will be ignored,
implying that the coefficients and error terms are partial with respect
to other variables. Then the linear probability representation of the
quit decision is:
When union workers are innately more stable, E(UNit hi) < 0, which biases
the least squares regression estimate of ~ toward a negative value, potentially
leading to the erroneous inference that unionism reduces quits when in fact~
may be o. With data on several time periods, the effect of h. can be
1
-eliminated by including in the regressions individual constants which will pick up
the personal propensity to quit. In the linear model this is equivalent
to taking deviations from means for all the variables. With data on two
periods, the analysis simplifies to a Simple difference equation:
Since the h. terms have been eliminated in (9), there is no prohlem in
1
/
estimating the effect of unionism by least squares.12
A comparable procedure using the logistic form (4), which is more
appropriate for the analysis of probabilities, has been developed by Gary
Chamberlain. His procedure essentially involves estimation of multinomial
logistic equations in which dependent variables relate to the pattern of
quits over time, and the independent variables are, as in the linear
case, deviations from means (or first differences in the two period case).
In ensuing empirical work I estimate the effect of unionism on tenure
and quit probabilities with standard cross-section models and then use
Chamberlain's fixed effect conditional 10git model to evaluate the importance
of behavioral as opposed to selectivity factors in the observed relations.
III Econometric Analysis
This study uses data from three longitudinal surveys of individuals
to estimate the effect of unionism on lengths of attachment between
workers and firms: the Michigna Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID);
the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of }!ature Men; and the National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Younger Men. 6 The PSID covers the entire
population while the NLS surveys deal with men aged 45-59 in 1966 and
men aged 14-24 in 1966. The longitudinal surveys have the advantage of
providing two types of information on attachment behavior: retro-
spective information from questions on job tenure; and longitudinal
information on actual quits or separations over time. Since the data relate
to individuals, it provides much better information about the attachment of wcrkers
to firms than the average tndustry turnover figures used in earlier stuoies.
The dependent variables
Figure 1 graphs the distribution of tenure in the three data sets
over several years and gives the means and standard deviation of tenure.
In the PSID survey, the means and standard deviations are calculated fromFigure 1: Mean, Standard Deviation and Frequency Distribution of Tenure
~
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Source: Michigan Panel Survey of Income Dynamics Data Tape; National Longitudinal Surveys for Men Ap,ed 45-59 in 1966
and Men Aged 14-24 in 1966.
(In the PSID the figures cover <1 1/2 years, 1 1/2 to 3 1/2 years; 3 1/2 to 9 1/2 years; 9~19 1/2 years; and 19 1/2 years pIu!14
grouped data with observations given the midpoint of the group. 7
In the NLS
survey, the means and standard deviations are cal:ulated from actual years
and the, data grouped for the purposes of displaying the distribution.
The figure reveals considerable attachment of workers to firms in
the United States. In the PSID Survey, mean tenure is on the order of
9 years, which implies that the probability of separation would be about
11% per annum. About one-third of the population is employed with the
same employer for over 10 years and 14-15% employed with the same employer
for over 20 years. In the older male NLS survey, mean levels of tenure are of
course higher, on the order of 15 to 16 years, with a marked concentration
of persons at the upper end of the distribution. Over one third of the
older men had been with their current employer 20 or more years and over
half had attained 15+ years of tenure. Among this group a rather large
number would appear to be more or less permanently attached to their
employers. In the younger male NLS survey, the figures show, ns might be
expected, relatively low levels of tenure: a mean in 1967 of
just 1.4 years and a mean in 1971 of 2.2 years. In this case, however,
this is too little time to achieve tenure to provide much information
about the overall distribution.
Reasons for breaks C
Attachment between workers and firms can be broken by employees
via quits, or by employers via discharges or permanent layoffs due
to plant closure or related economic factors which require reductions in
employment. Table 1 examines the distribution of reasons for the termination of
employment relations in the PSID and NLS data sets. In each data set quits are aDue to differences in questions
Table 1:, Rates of Separation Between Workers and Firms
Worker Initiated Employer-Initiated
Total Quit Other Total Layoff Discharge Plant Closing
NLS Older Men
1966-71 20.7 20.7 -- 10.6 10.0 0.6 c
1968-69 7.7 7.7 -- 4.5 4.5 c c
1969-71 10.8 10.8 -- 7.4 7.2 0.2 c
NLS Younger Men
20. 3d 1972-75 20.3 -- 7.8 6.8 1.0 c
Total Quit Other Total Plant Closing _.
Michigan PSID
1968-69 8.4 7.0 1.4 2.1 1.4 0.7
1969-70 8.4 7.7 0.7 2.7 1.6 1.1
1970-71 7.5 6.5 1.0 3.7 2.5 1.2
1971-72 6.7 5.9 0.8 3.5 2.4 1.1
1972-73 8.1 7.4 0.7 2.9 2.0 0.9
1973-74 8.9 8.3 0.6 2.6 1.6 1.0
aExcludes from numerator and denominator p~rsons who retired. Excludes from numerator persons with reasons
for leaving given as not available.
b . Includes left employer, reason not available (2.8% in 1966-71).
c .
Included in Layoff.
dExcludes from numerator several small categories, such as quit to go to school.
Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Men, Codebook Reference No. 2575, 2476, 1598.
and coding data are not entirely consistent across periods.
NLS Male Codebook, Reference Numbers 4205, 4207 ....
\J1
Michigan Panel Survey of Income Dynamics. Tape codes and indices for variables, "What happened to previous
job."16
much more common cause of changes in jobs than are employer-initiated
separations. In the older male NLS about 2/3rds of the changes from 1966 to
1971 are attributable to quits; in the younger male NLS sample, 72% of
the changes result from worker-initiated quits. The figures on the PSID
are somewhat more difficult to read because of an ambiguous 'other'
category, which consists of breaks due to military service and other
unspecified causes. \-lith "other" included under worker-initiated changes,
breaks due to employees leaving their employer are from 3 to 4 times as
important as employer-initiated changes. With "other" excluded, the differ-
ences range from 1.5 to 3.5 to one. All told, the data show that termination
of tenure depends primarily on 'tvorker-initi.atec decisions.
Establishmeilt turnover data for manufacturing tell a similar story,
once temporary layoffs are removed from the published layoff rates. From
1967 to 1976 quits averaged 2.2% per month in the BLS turnover figures
while layoffs averaged 1.4%. Given that about 68 percentof layoffs are
temporary (See Lilien), the permanent layoff rate is only 0.4% per month,
which makes quits five times as important. Other separations, including
retirement, averaged 0.9 percent, so that quits constituted nearly 2/3rds of
permanent separations (=2.2/(2.2+.4+.9)).
The tendency for a typical worker to cumulate considerable job tenure
and for quits to be the prime form of breaking employment relations are
important facets of the job market, indicative of the nature of cTI~lo)~cnt
contracts and remuneration schemes.
Determinants of tenure
Estimates of the effect of unionism and other (control) variables
on job tenure were made using three functional forms, the linear, loglinear17
and exponential. The exponential was clearly dominated by the other forms
in terms of fit, presumably because the hazard function depends on past
tenure~ Accordingly, I focus on the other two forms.
Table 2 presents the coefficient gnd standard errors obtained from
linear and 10g1inear regressions of tenure on a measure of unionism, a
0-1 dummy variable for whether or not the work place is governed by a
collective bargaining agreement, log earnings, selected personal character-
istics and "other controls," notably dummy variables for occupation,
industry, region, and residence in an SMSA. Inclusion of earnings in the
equations holds fixed the effect of unionism on tenure due to monopoly
wage gains, and thus limits the union variable to reflecting the nonwage
effects of the institution. It also provides a potentially stronger control
for the "quality" of workers then is given by other variables.
The personal, institutional and various control variables are
essentially exogenous to tenure, and thus are properly treated as right-hand
side variables. Wages, which should increase the desire of workers to
remain with a firm but which can have the opposite effect on the desire of
employers to keep workers, cannot be so viewed. Wages are surely also influenced
by tenure, creating simultaneity problems. Since essentially the same
variables that affect wages can be expected a priori to affect tenure, there
is no obvious way to identify the line of causality. The extent to which the
coefficients on wages and the coefficients on unionism in the tenure
equation are biased due to simultaneity can, however, be estimated by
considering the possible magnitudes of the impact of wages on tenure and
of tenure on wages. Tenure is usually found to raise wages by 2% to 3% in
a cross-section, giving a coefficient of .02 or .03 in a log earnings
equation. This implies coefficients on wages in a tenure equation due to the
reverse direction of causality ranging from 33(=1/.03) to 50(1/.02). Since18
Table 2: Regression Estimates of the Effect
of Unionism and Other Variables on Job Tenure,


























Coefficients and Standard Errors
1.55(.27) .31(.04) 2.96(.57) .32(.07) .24(.10) .13(.05)
1.66(.22) .37(.04) 2.13(.57) .15(.07) .21(.13) .14(.06)
4.71(.56) .63(.07)
.33(.01) .05(.004) .44(.06) .03(.01) .21(.02) .10(.(1)
.08(.29) .08(.05) 1.73(.65) .23(.08) -.33(.11) -.16(.05)
.93(.33) .02(.05)
-.08(.04) -.01(.01) .07(. 09) .01(.01) -.07(.02) -.03(.01)
.10(.06) .04(.01) 1.04 (.80) .18(.09) .04(.04) .02(.02)
Numbers of Other Controls
Constant 1 1 1 1 1 1
Occupation Dummies 8 8 7 7 7 7
Region Dummies 3 3 3 3 3 3
Industry Dummies 5 5 9 9 9 9
SMSA Dummy 1 1 1 1
Summary Statistics
R2 .35 .33 .23 .23 .21 .23
SEE 6.59 1.07 9.81 1.14 1.71 .79
Source: NLS Older Male, NLS Younger Male, Michigan PSID Survey Tapes19
any reasonable impact of wages on tenure would, be much lower, simultaneity
ld b · d h ff" . h' . IS wou appear to las upwar t e coe lClent on wages ln t e tenure regresslons.
Moreover, since unionism is positively related to tenure and positively
related to wages, the inclusion of tenure without adjusting for simultaneity
will bias downward the coefficient on unionism in the equation.lO Failure to
adjust for the simultaneity problem thus creates a more stringent test of the
influence of unionism on tenure.
In the older male NLS data set an additional measure of compensation,
the presence of a retirement plan at the work place, is included in the
regressions. Since unionism is likely to be positively associated with
the existence of a pension plan and pension plans should increase attachment
to the firm, it is important to control for such a factor if one is to
isolate the nonmonopoly wage impact of unionism on attachment.
There are two basic results in Table 2. First, even with log of
earnings in the equation unionism obtains sizeable and highly statistically
significant coefficients in all three samples in both the linear and loglinear
forms. In the Michigan PSID sample the coefficient in the linear regression
is 1.6, implying that unioniz ed workers have over 1 1/2 years more tenure than
otherwise comparable nonunion workers, while the coefficient in the loglinear
form sho"ivs ar. approximate one-third differential. In the older male NLS
sample, where the average level of tenure is higher than in the PSID, the
linear regression coefficient on unionism is correspondingly higher, while
the loglinear regression coefficient is comparable to that obtained in the PSIn.
In the younger male NLS sample, on the other hand, the effect of unionism in
both linear and loglinear forms is markedly smaller, though still significant.II
To the extent that earnings variables capture the full union monopoly
wage, the results imply that unionism increases lengths of emplOyment20
spells between workers and firms in ~ays that go beyond raising wages.
Whether this involves the "voice" routes of impact, selectivity, or other
factors remains to be seen.
The second important result pertains to the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients on unionism relative to the magnitude of the estimated
coefficient on earnings. Despite the likely upward bias in the coefficient
on earnings and down,mrd bias in the coefficient on unionism due to simul-
taneity, the coefficients are of roughly comparable magnitudes, even in the
younger male NLS sample. This implies that an increase in wages on the
order of 100+% is needed to increase tenure by as much as the move from
nonunion to union status, The union impact on attachment is, according to
the estimates in Table 2, very large.
With respect to other variables in the analysis, the most important
variable in all of the calculations is, of course, age, which raises tenure
substantially. Not surprisingly, being male also raises tenure noticeably.
Being black reduces tenure in the younger male NLS sample but raises
tenure in the PSID and older male 1~S samples. The absence of a marked
black dLsadvantage in tenure is surprising in light of extensive contro-
versy regarding the conflict between seniority and affirmative action. It
suggests that there is no great racial disparity in accrual of tenure
(and thus of seniority benefits) which would make formal seniority systems
, "
a major deterrent to black economic advancement. ~~
The coefficients on years of schooling in the regressions are small or
negative, which might appear to run counter to the common assumption that general
human capital (= education) is positively correlated with specific human capital
and thus is positively related to tenure. Because the regressions control
for age rather than years in the job market,however, such an inference21
would be erroneous. Indeed, holding years since leaving school fixed, the
calculations imply a positive effect of schooling on tenure, with a coefficient
roughly equal to the coefficient on age. As years since leavi~g school
equals age minus years of schooling minus a constant, the coefficient on
education can be obtained from:
(10) a"Age + B Years of Schoolin5
+ (B + a) Years of Schooling
a [Age - Years of Schoolingl
The large coefficients on age (~) in table 2 imply that while more
educated persons have less tenure than less educated persons of the same
age, they have significantly more tenure than less educated persons with
the same years since leaving school.
Finally, the industry and occupation "controls" listed at the bottom
of .Table 2 reveal very different patterns of attachment of workers to
employers in different job markets. In terms of occupations, the regression
coefficients (not recorded in the table) show that managers and craftworkers
tend to accrue the most tenure while service workers, laborers, clerical
and sales employees have the least. The strong occupational dimension of
tenure may reflect the importance of differences in specific training,
conplcnentarity with capital~ or institutional rules. In terms of
industries, the regressions show that workers accrus (all else the same)
greater tenure in durable and nondurable manufacturing, while in all
but the young male NLS, they also accrue mqre in transportation and less
in construction, communication and utilities, services and trade.
Since the analysis has controlled for the (observed) personal characteristics
of workers, the patterns presumably result from the employer side of
the market, for both institutional and technical reasons.
The substantial coefficients obtained on the occupation and industry
dummy variables raise the possibility that unionism and the other22
determinants of tenure may have different effects on different types of
workers and in different markets. To see whether there are important
differences across markets and subgroups, separate loglinear tenure
regressions were estimated in the Hichigan PSID sample for persons divided
by sex, occupation and industry. The results of the estimates, summarized
in table 3, reveal sizeable differences in the impact of unio~ism on
tenure in the different groups. Taking the male/female comparisons first,
columns 1 and 2 show a much greater coefficient on unionism for men, which
could be taken to result from male dominance of unio~s that makes unions
more attuned to the desires of male workers. Among the three occupations
considered--professionals, operatives and clericals--unionism raises the
tenure of operatives and clericals more than the tenure of professionals.
The industry calculations also reveal substantial differences in the impact
of unionism, with unionism having a markedly larger impact in manufacturing
than elsewhere. The coefficients on wages also vary by occupation and industry,
being larger for operatives and clerical workers than for professionals
and being larger in trade and manufacturing than in services.
The different coefficients obtained on the union variable across
groups provides general support for the view that trade unionism is a
complex institution, whose impacts vary depending on economic and other
circumstances. In section IVan attempt is made to use the 'different
magnitudes of the union effect across industries to make inferences abcut
the mechanisms by which unionism increases job tenure.
Econometric problems
To vThat extent might the results in tables 2 and 3 be distorted by
measurement error of key variables or omission of important variables?
Might the finding of a strong union effect on tenure be erroneous?
There are two potential problems with the calculations which couldTable 3: Regression Estimates of the Effect of Unionism and Other Variables on Job Tenure
in Different Markets, Michigan PSID, 1972





Profession- Operatives Clerical Service Trade Hanufactur-
als (493) (734) (504) (491) (532)~ lng (1045)
7.78 7.42 6.75 7.90 6.95 8.52
Coefficients and Standard Errors in Log Linear Regressions
Independent Variables
Union .34(.05) .15(.12) .16(.15) .30(.09) .51(.12) .12(.18) .18(.13) .34(.07)
Ln Earnings .38(.04) .33(.09) .29(.10) .72(.10) .61(.11) .16(.09) .52(.10) .59(.08)
Age .05(.001) .05(.003) .06(.004) .06(.003) .04(.004) .05(.004) .05(. 004) .05(.003)
Race(l=black) .07(.05) .17(.11) -.53(.16) .18(.09) .21(.13) .33(.16) .52(.14) -.02(.08)
Sex (1=fema1e) -- -- .17(.14) -.03(.13) -.02(.12) .11(.15) .22(.15) -.21(.12)
Years of Schooling -.01(.01) .01(.02) -.02(.02) .01(.01) -.04(. 02) .01(.02) -.04(.02) -.01(. 01)
Number of Dependents .05(.01) -.03(. 03) .07(.03) .02(.02) .01(.03) .04(.03) ~.02(.03) .04(.02)
Numbers of Other Controls
Region Dummies 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Industry Dummies 5 5· 5 5 5 0 0 0
Occupational Dummies 8 8 0 0 .) 8 8 8
Constant 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




R2 .35 .29 .37 .40 .33 .31 .34 .38
SEE 1. 07 1.08 1.04 1.03 1.09 1.14 1.11 1.01
anummh variables for whether there is a shortage of workers in the SMSA, whether it is a high unemployment area, and
whet er the area wage is high.
Source: MichiRan PSID dntn tnpescause the estimated coefficients on unionism to be biased upward. First
is the lack of information on fringe benefits (with the exception of the
retirement plan variable in the older male NLS data set). Since fringes
are likely to be higher under unionism and should raise tenure, omission or
understatement of fringe behefits could result in a higher coefficient on
the union du~y variable, distorting interpretation of that coefficient.
The coefficient would reflect union monopoly wage effects on fringe8 ~s
well as the nonmonopoly wage effects of concern. To obtain some notion of
the magnitude of the bias, consider the least squares equation linking
the partial regression coefficient on unionism with fringes fixed to the
coefficients which do not partial for fringes:
(11)
h b the coefficient from unionism in the tenure equation corrected were TU.F =
for the omitted fringe variable
b = the estimated coefficient on ~enure TU
tpU the regression coefficient linking fringes to unionism
bTF = the regression linking tenure to fringes
r FU = the correlation of fringes and unionism
and where all the coefficients are partial with respect to the other variables
in the model.
Available information about the likely magnitudes of the coefficients
in (11) suggest only a moderate upward bias in the estimated effect of
unionism, of at most 5%. For bFU and r FU' estimates in Freeman (1978a,
table 3) indicate that, conditional on stratht-time pay, industry dummies
and other control variables, r FU = .30 while bFU = .11. An extremely high
estimate of bTF would be the coefficient obtained on log wages in the
regressions: since fringes constitute no more than one-third of the wage
bill, this implies that a dollar of fringes is three times as effective in
reducing quits as a dollar of wages. With these estimates, the union
coefficient in column 1 of table 2 (where wages have their 2reatest irnoact25
relative to unionism) is reduced to 1.50, while there is virtually no impact
on the coefficients in other columns.13 Unless the magnitudes of the fringe-union-
quit coefficients are markedly off, correction for the omission of fringes
still leaves a sizeable union effect that is not due to monopoly compensation
gains, including fringes.
A second and more diffic'ult problem relates to the lack of adequate
data on the options facing an individual which might induce a break in
employment. While we have information on wages in the current job, we
have only the crudest measures of ~0tential wages in alternative jobs. If
union workers had worse opportunities in the market than other workers,
say because unions attracted less able persons, the coefficient on unionism
would be biased upward in the tenure regressions. If, on the other hand,
union workers were more able than otherwise comparable nonunion workers
(due, presumably, to selectivity of more able workers by high-paying firms)
the coefficient on unionism would be biased downard in the tenure reerp~~;nns.
To obtain some notion of the direction and possible magnitude of the
bias, consider the equation linking the partial regression coefficient
of unionism on tenure, with alternative wage opportunities (WA) as well as
current wages held fixed, to regression coefficients which do not partial
on alternative wages:
where b - = coefficient on unionism in the tenure equation holding TUTWWA
fixed wages and alternative wages
bTU'W= estimated coefficients with alternative wages not held fixed
b = coefficient linking tenure to alternative wages, with unionism
TWA"UW
and current wages fixed
bWAU"W = coefficient linking alternative wages to unionism, conditional
on current wages
The coefficient b should be :1egative , as persons with good alternatives
TWA'UW26
are unlikely to remain with a given employer and accrue t~nure. Hence the
sign of the bias on the coefficient on unionism depends solely on bq U
\"A .W.
An estimate of bWAU.Wcan be bbtained by regressing the In wages of persons
who changed jobs in the Michigan sample on their previous wage and union
status and other aspects of the job for each year. While by no means
perfect, the- relation between unionism and the wages obtained on the new
job provides at least a crude indication of whether or not unionized
workers who switch employers have better or worse opportunities than other
workers who switch employers. If the regression coefficient on unionism is
positive, then the argument that union workers have longer attachments because
they are less able than nonunion workers would be difficult to maintain. The
calculations yield the following estimate




for other years.14 These figures
suggest that the estimates of the union effect in tables 2 and 3 are, if anything,
understated due to failure to control adequately for alternative opportunities.
separations
The attachment between employees and firms can also be evaluated in '
terms of the job separations which break spells of tenure. While separations
convey less information about the probability of attachment than job tenure,
(since separation relates to a single break in employment while tenure represents
decisions over extended time periods) analysis of separation in longitudinal
data has some advantages in evaluating the effect of unionism on attachment
of workers to firms. The probability of separation can be related to the
characteristics of an initial job, including wages and tenure, which
breaks the wage-tenure simultaneity problem. Second, it enables us to differ-
entiate between worker-initiated and emplby~r-init~ated breaks in the employ-
ment relation and thus to determine by which route unions influence tenure.
Third, with extended longitudinal files, we can isolate the behavioral effect
of unionism from the selectivity effect using the fixed effect model of section II.27
Accordingly, the .effect of unionism and other variables on the probability
of separations was estimated using the three data sets under study. In the
older male and younger male NLS data sets, the probability of separations from
1969 to 1971 was related to the relevant independent variables. To focus on
persons quitting to take another job, the samples were limited to those
employed in -both 1969 and 1971. In the Michigan PSID, information on separa-
tions for the years 1966 to 1973 was grouped into a single ~ooled sample, in
which each observation links changes from year t to t+l to the characteristics
of workers and jobs in t. The pooled sample contains 21,173 observations,
with multiple observations on individuals (with differences in the number of
observations per person due to deletions of certain persons over time).
The results of the calculations are given in table 4. The odd-numbered
regressions exclude job tenure as an independent variable. The even-numbered
regressions include tenure and thus provide estimates of the effect of unionism
on the separation behavior of workers with the same levels of tenure. To the
extent that past tenure results from different individual propensities to
rGmain with an employer, inclusion of tenure in the regressions C~" hn viewed
as a means of controlling for individual differences and thus for effects
of union selectivity of more stable workers.
The calculations confirm the significant effect of unionism on the
attachment of workers to firms found in tables 2 and 3. In the
older male NLS, the coefficient for unionism is highly significant, -.81
with tenure ~{cluded and -.63 with it included. By co?trast, the effect
of In wages on separations is insignificant and positive, contrary to
expectations. In the Michigan PSID (columns 3 and 4) unionism is estimated
to reduce separations with a logistic coefficient of -.41 (tenure excluded)
and -.33 (tenure included). This compares to comparable effects on tenure
of .31 from the loglinear calculations in table 2. The wage variable is
also estimated to have a sizeable effect, also with a magnitude comparable to
that obtained in table 2.28
Table 4
Logistic Curve Parameters for the Effects of Variables on the Probability of Separation
Older Hale NLS !'~lchigan PSID Younger }f<:'.le NLS u
1 2 3 4 5 6
Mean of separations .11 .11 .12 .12 .54 .54
Coefficients and Standard Errors in Log Linear Regressions
Explanatory Variables
unionism -.81(.12) -.63(.22) -.41(.06) -.33(.06) -.20(.13) -.26(.13)
In '\oTage ".08 (.19) .16(.21) -.25(.04) -.09(.04) -.73(.18) -.59(.17)
tenure -.1l(.01) -.08(.01) -.11(.03)
age -.06(.02) -.04(.02) -.04(.07) -.03(.002) -.13(. 02) -.08(.03)
education -.02(.03) -.01(.03) -.01(.01) -.01(. 01) .01(.03) -.01(.03)
sex (1=female) -.13(.06) -.19(.06)
race (l=black) ~.37 (.24) -.22(.25) -.35(.06) -.31(.06) -.01(.14) -.14(.14)
number of dependents -.17(.25) -.01(.26) -.09(.04) -.12(.05)
Numbers of Other Controls
industry dummies 9 9 5a 5a
9 9
occupation dummies 6 6 8 8 6 6
region dummies 3 3 3 3
SHSA 1 1
I 1 1
measures of local 1 1 3 3 1 1
labor conditionsb
years of work experience 1 1
constant 1 1 1 1 1 1
year dummies 4 4
dummy for poverty statusc 1 1
dummy for presence of 1 1
retirement plan
job satisfaction . d d 1 1 ln ex
Summary Statistic
-Ln likelihood .514 464 7272 7088 1080 1076
Number of observations 1772 1772 21,173 21,173 1741 1741
aIndustry dummies based on data from 1972 and later years. Prior to 1972 there were no
industry questions; the 1972 data were used for earlier years.
bDummy variables as described in footnote a, table 3.
CDummyfor persons in the Michigan Survey who were in the special poverty sample group.
~easured as z-score (see R. Freeman, "Job Satisfaction as an Economic Variable," AER, May 1978).29
Finally, in the younger male NLS computations unionism is also found to reduce
the probability of separating, while In wages and the demographic factors
have comparable effects to those given in table 2.
All told the separation results appear roughly consistent with the
tenure results presented earlier.
Quits versus layoffs and discharges
The analysis thus far has examined the effect of unions on overall
separations, without differentiating between employer-initiated and worker-
initiated breaks in employment. Do unions reduce separations by lowering
quits or by affecting discharges and permanent layoffs?
Table 4 presents calculations designed to answer this important question.
It records the resu1t~ of maximum likelihood estimates of the effect of
unionism and other variables on quits and other separations separately.
Columns 1-2 give the estimated coefficients on the two forms of -separation
in the NLS. Columns 3-4 present the results of similar calculations for
the Michigan PSID for the period 1972-73. Significant differences in the
union impact are apparent in both data sets. Unionism reduces quits
substantially but has essentially no effect or a modest positive effect
on other separations. We conclude that the union impact on tenure operates
through workers' decisions rather than through the decisions of employers.
Selectivity vs. behavior
The analysis thus far has shown that unionism raises tenure and reduces
separations and that these effects are not due to union monopoly wage gains
nor to lower employer-initiated separations but rather to reductions in quit
rates. Is the reduction in quits, with wage~ held fixed, due to selectivity
of more stable persons by unions or is it due to actual changes in behavior
caused by the institution?
To analyze this question, I have estimated the fixed effects1ogis-
tic model discussed in section 215 using longitudinal data from the PSID.30
Table 5
Logistic Curve Estimates of the Effect of Unionism and Other Variables
on quits and Other Separations














































































aThe mean of quits in the Old Hen NLS was smaller than the mean of other separations
because many quitters did not have other jobs by 1971. While not reported as retiring
they may in fact have left the labor force.
bSee table 3, footnote a.
Source: Older ~~le NLS, Michigan PSID data tapes
Estimated with Maximum Likelihood Logistic Program31
Since with individual constants in the equations, the behavior of persons
who remain in their job over the whole period or who quit in each period is
explained entirely by the constant, the sanp1e drops from that used in
table 2 to 1232 cases, consisting of 877 cases of a single quit, 276 cases
of 2 quits, 67 cases of 3 quits, and 12 cases of 4 quits.16
The results of the calculations, given below, yield coefficients on
unionism of comparable magnitude to those obtained earlier. This implies that







Coefficient and standard error





The union impact appears to operate by changing the behavior of the
same person rather than by organization of innately more stable persons.
In an organized work place a given individual is less likely to quit than
in a nonorganized work place, wages held fixed.
Note, moreover, that while the coefficient on unionism is essentially
unaffected by correcting for the omitted person factor, the coefficient
on wages is significantly affected by the correctio~goingfrom significant
negative to insignificant positive. The differential effect of the
individual constants on the union and wage coefficients may reflect the
fact that wages are more person related than unionism, which is m~ch
more of a social phenomenon.
IV. Routes of the Union Effect
The preceding analysis has yielded two basic findings: 1) Unionized32
workers accrue greater tenure with employers than nonunion workers. 2) The
greater tenure is not primarily the result of union wage gains, reduced employer-
initiated layoffs or discharges nor of unioni~ation of innately more stable
workers. While it is tempting to attribute the unexplained union effect to the
'voice' and industrial jurisprudence components of unionism, the analysis has
thus far proceeded by eliminating causal factors and has not provided any
positive evidence of their impact on tenure, making any such attribution
speculative.
This section seeks to provide some evidence that tenure is, in fact,
positively influenced by the voice/industrial jurisprudence aspects of
unionism. It examines the effect on job tenure of two union institutions,
grievance/arbitration and seniority rules. Two types of evidence are
evaluated: regressions linking differences in grievance/arbitration
systeTI!s and seniority across unionized markets to the tenure of union
workers; and information from personnel studies and industrial relations
experts. While by no means definitive, the evidence suggests that grievance/
arbitration and inverse seniority layoff rules contribute significantly to
the union-tenure relation.
Grievance/arbitration and seniority
Table 6 presents evidence on the prevalence and characteristics of the
two components of unionism to be studied. Lines land 2 record the
percentage of major collective bargaining contracts and the percentage of
workers covered by those contracts having various types of grievance or
arbitration clauses. Lines 3-5 record similar information regarding
seniority rules.
Line 1 shows that while nearly,all major contracts provide for
grievance of disputes regardine the terms and application of the contract33
there is significant variation in the breadth of grievance clauses, with some
grievance clauses aLlowing for unrestricted coverage of issues while others
have grievance clauses that limit the grievance process to disputes
arising under specific contract clauses. A somewhat larger number of
contracts and workers fall into the category of restricted grievance clauses.
Information (not recorded in the table) on the distribution of the two
types of clauses by industry shows, further, considerable industry variation,
with ~ome industries having primarily unrestricted clauses (chemicals, paper)
and other industries having largely restricted clauses (petroleum, fabricated
metals) .17
Line 2 of the tabl~ shows that arbitration systems are also highly
prevalent among unionized firms, with 96.1 percent of contract containing
clauses providing for arbitration, 69.9% of which COVErall grievable issues.
Seniority rules, consisting of competitive seniority, which governs
the status of workers relative to others in layoffs, promotions, and related'
internal labor market decisions, and of benefit seniority, which relates
benefits to length of services, are also COlIU11on in the organized sector,
especially in manufacturing (line 3). Competitive seniority is especailly
important in layoff decisions, with over 96% of major collective contracts
in manufacturing having provisions for layoff by seniority and 70% of
major contracts outside of manufacturing also having such provisions (line 4).
Most of the clauses make seniority the sole or primary factor in layoffs,
usually with plantwide or subdivision scope.
Line 5 shows that seniority ·is a formal factor in promotion
decisionsin about 60% of major contracts, covering nearly 60% of workers,
largely in manufacturing. Seniority provisions for promotion can be
roughly.divided into two types:
(a) "Strong" seniority clauses, which guarantee the senior worker the
promotion if he or she is capable of meeting minim~m or average standards for34
Table 6: Crievance/Arbitration and Seniority Provisions





















2. With Arbitration Clausesa
With Arbitration Clauses Covering All Grievable Issuesa
With Arbitration Clauses Excluding Some Grievancesa
3. With Seniority System, All Industry
With Seniority System, Nanufacturing
With Seniority System, Nonmanufacturing
3. With Seniority as Factor in Layoffs, All Industry
With Seniority as Factor in Layoffs, Manufacturing
With Seniority as Factor in Layoffs, Nonmanufacturing
Seniority as Sole or Primary Factor in Layoffs
Plantwide Scope of Seniority System
Subdivision Scope of Seniority System
Job Scope of Seniority System
5. With Seniority as Factor in Promotions, All Industry
With Seniority as Factor in Promotions, Manufacturing
With Seniority as Factor in Promotions, Nonmanufacturing
\\fith "Strong" Seniority in Promotions
With "Weak Seniority in T'rolilotions
6. Seniority as a Factor in Benefits:
3 or More Weeks Vacation When Worker Has Specified Amount




















































aFigures for percent with grievance or arbitration clauses are taken from Bulletin 1957.
Figures for type of coverage are based on distribution of contracts with grievance or
arbitration from Bulletin 1425.
Source:
lines 1,2: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Characteristics of Major Collective Bargainin~
Agreements, Bulletin 1957, tables 8.1 and 8.2, p. 94 for fraction with grievance and
arbitration clauses.
Coverag: ~f ~rievance claus~s, U.S. Bureau of Labor ~tatistics, Maior Collective
Bargalnlng Agreements, Grl.evance Procedure:.s BulletJ.n 1425-1, tab e 1, p.. z: wlth
unrestricted or covers all, defined as all disputes with no exclusions.






p:S. Bureau·of Labor Statistics, Najor Collective Bargaining Agreements,
Administration of Seniority, 1425-14, table 1, p. 32.
Layoff, Recall, and Worksharing Procedures, 1425-13, tables 8, 11, 14,
pp. 53-55, with total figures from table 8 and distribution from tables 11, 14.
Senioritv in Promotion and Transfer Provisions, 1425-11, talbes 1-2, pp, 36-37.
Paid Vac~tion and Holiday Provisions, 1425-9, table 5, p. 51.35
the work. As an example of this form of contract, consider the following
clause:
Job vacancies shall be filled on the basis of seniority,
providing the employee has the physical fitness, knowledge,
skill, and efficiency to perform the job." (American Can Co.-
Glass Bottle Blowers, contrac·t ending April 1968).
(b) "\\eak" seniority clauses, which give the job to the St,nior
worker only if other qualifying factors are relatively the same, as
exemplifiec in the following:
When there is an opening to be filled by promotion,
employees in that division shall be considered on the basis
of their seniority and job qualifications. When job qualifi-
cations are approximately equal, then the employees with the
greatest seniority shall be given the opportunity. Only in
the evettan employee with less seniority has superior job
qualificaUons shall he be entitled to the promotion. (Cater-
pillar Tractor Co.-lAM, contract ending Jan. 1968).
According to data in line 5, the weaker seniority clauses
cover many more workers than the stronger clauses, though the actual differ-
ence between their application is by no means clear. In many arbitration
cases, less senior workers must often be "head and shoulder" above more
senior workers to obtain a promotion even under the weaker provision.
Line 6 of the table presents some contract evidence on benefit
seniority•. It records the percentage of workers with different levels
of seniDrity eligible for a vacation period of 3 or more weeks. The
fraction rises sharply, particularly between 5 and 10 years of seniority,
indicating the dependence of this benefit on job tenure. Nonunion companies
also tend to relate benefits to seniority.
The grievance and seniority clauses examined in table 6 differ across
less aggregate industries as well as between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing
as shown in the table. These differences provide a means of examining the
effect of these factors on job tenure. If unionism increases tenure by
providing grievance systems or seniority rules, organized workers in sectors
where grievance or seniority clauses are stronger should accrue
greater tenure than organized workers in other sectors. To test.this36 .
proposition, I added the following measures of the prevalence of grievance
and seniority clacses in two-digit manufacturing and one-digit nonmanufacturing
industries to the older male NLS and to the Michigan PSID tapes:
(1) The percentage of contracts in an industry with unrestricted
coverage of issues in the grievance system
(2) The percentage of contracts in an industry with seniority clauses.
(3) The percentage of contracts which contain clauses governing
layoffs (presumably relating to the role of seniority in layoffs).
These variabl~s were obtained for 2-digit manufacturing and I-digit
nonmanufacturing industries from the Collective Bargaining Agreements
Series of the B.L.S, as specified in the table notes.
Linear tenure equations for union workers were then estimated, with the
new variables replacing the industry dummies used in previous calculations.
To make sure that the calculations were not unduly influenced by the
construction industry, which for technological reasons has high turnover
and only limited use of grievance or seniority provisions, construction
was deleted from the sample: its inclusion greatly strengthens the estimated
impact of the contract variables. Because there are numerous other clauses
that differ across industries, the regressions should not be interpreted to
mean that addition of a particular clause will, in fact, alter attachment
by the amount specified by the coefficient. The variables are merely
indicators of practices.
Table 7 presents the coefficients on the contract variables. While
crude, the estimates suggest that the selected rules and operating procedures
influence the attachment between workers and firms. The coefficients in
columns 1-3 for the older male NLS sample show tha~ introduced
separately, each of the provisions is positively statistically significantly
associated with tenure. The estimates in column 4 show that when entered
as a group, grievance and layoff provisions have very siz~able and significant
effects, while the coefficient on seniority drops to insignificance. The37
Table 7: Regression Estimates of the Effect of Coverage of Grievance. Clauses












Coefficients and Standard Errors
Contract Variablesa
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layoff provisions























































































































The mean and standard deviation of the independent variables
NLS
percentage non-restrictive grievances .45(.17)
percentage with layoff .96(.11)






bThere were no families or self-employed workers in the sample so the number of dummies
affecting the calculations was 2 less than the number in the text.
cNote that construction has been eliminated as an industry in these calculations.
Source: NLS Older Male and Michigan PSrD data tapes. Contract provisions from
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, }luj0r Collective Bargaining Agreements
Bulletin 1425-1, table 1, p. 2; Bulletin 1425-14, table 1, p. 32; BulJetin
14~5-13, table 8, p. 53.38
Michigan PSID results ~n columns 5-8 are roughly comparable, with one
exception: the percentage of contracts with nonrestrictive grievance
clauses has, by itself, an insignificant impact on tenure.. In conjunction
with the other variables, however, it obtains a substantial positive
coefficient, indicating that the scope of the grievance system is related
to accumulation of tenure. As far as these data go, the rules of
structured labor markets appear to be important detenminantsof the
attachment between workers and firms. . ,
Limited information from other sources provides additional support
for the view that the grievance system is an important route by which
unionism increases years of tenure. First, there is direct evidence of a
link between the existence of a grievance system and attachment of workers
to firms from a personnel study by Sargent and Clauson, who compared
turnover in hospitals with a written grievance system to turnover in
hospitals without such a system. Their data show a year separation rate
of .50 for hospitals with a grievance system compared to .81 for those
without and a correlation between the 0-1 grievance variable and turnover
of -.72. While absence of other control variables, notably wages, makes
these relations suggestive rather than definitive, the significant relation
between turnover and grievance procedure supports our interpretation of
the evidence on the tapes for individuals.
The industrial relations literature provides further support for the
argument that a grievance system reduces separations and raises job tenure.
In a leading book on grievances, one arbitrator noted that because "in most
nonorganized companies it is very difficult to appeal a supervisor's
decision [due to lack of grievance machinery] • • • dissatisfied employees
must either live with their frustrations or quit (Trotta, p. 105), !fIle latter
option reducing tenure in those firms. Labor-management legal
consultants usually advise companies facing unionization drives to concentrate39
on personnel policy issues relating to what would often be grievable issues
in a union setting, suggesting that resolution of such problems is viewed
as a major attraction of unions to workers. Similarly, studies of why
workers join unions tend to find worker grievances with specific managerial
policies a major factor in organization (Seidman, Landon, Karsh).
We conclude that the available evidence, while sparse, supports the
notion that unionism increases job tenure through the "voice" and industrial
jurisprudence routes of impact.
v. Conclusion
This study has examined the effect of unionism on one of the most
important determinants of the labor market status of individuals, job
tenure, defined as the length of attachment between workers and firms.
The analysis has found that:
(1) The U.S. work force has accrued considerable job tenure, with
average incomplete spells across the whole work force of about 8 years
but with much higher levels for older men. Upwards of 25% of the
work force and 60% of older male workers have accrued 10 or more years of
(incomplete) tenure with a firm. The principal reason for breaks in tenure
are worker-initiated changes in the form of quits, which are 2-3 times as
important as layoffs and other employer-initiated changes.
(2) Trade unionism is associated with significantly greater job
tenure and conversely with significantly lower probabilities of separation.
(3) The increase in worker attachment to firms resulting from unionism
is not due largely to monopoly wage increases nor to reductions in emp1oyer-
initiated separations nor to unionization of more stable workers bur rather to
changes in worker behavior due to union work settings.
(4) While difficult to pin down, some of the union effect on tenure40
appears due to grievance systems and specific work rules like seniority,
which reflect in part the role. of unionism as an institution of "voice" in
the job market. To some extent at least increased tenure due to the voi~e and
industrial jurisprudence mode. of operation should be vie\ved as socially
beneficial, reducing the costs of turnover and thus raising productivity.
These findings have important implications for understanding the
economics of trade unions and for the direction of research on unions.
They suggest that unions have sizeable non-monopoly wage effects on the
job market which should be taken into account in any social evaluation of
the institution. They provide some support for the traditional industrial
relations view of unionism as a complex institution which causes wide-
ranging changes in the job market. They suggest that modern empirical
research on trade unionism, which currently focuses almost exclusively
on estimating monopoly wage effects, should also analyze the non-monopoly
wage voice or industrial jurisprudence impacts of unions. Unions have
monopoly wage effects but they also have more subtle, potentially
socially beneficial economic effects on the job market that deserve attention.41
Footnotes
lIn this study tenure relates to years of employment with a particular firm.
It does not refer to academic tenure.
2pencavel and Browq-Medoff report significant coefficients on unionism in
quit equatioris while Parsons and Burton and Parker do not. Stoikov and
Raimon find different union effects depending on the other tneure variables
included in their calculations. For a general assessment stressing the
inconclusive nature of the results see Reynolds (p. 568). For an opposite
one see Freeman (1979).
3For delays in quits to raise tenure there must be some nonzero probability of
redressing the grievance, so that the worker is willing to try the option and
the length of employment must be finite, for otherwise delays will not affect
the steady state solution. If, on average, the length of employment were
initially, say 10 years, then a delay in quitting for, say 1/2 year,
would reduce the quit rate from 10% to about 9 1/2%, raising tenure to 10.5
years in a steady state equilibrium.
4The complexity of some of the tenure equations can be seen in Mann, Shafer,
and Singpurwaller.
5The equation linking the distribution of incomplete spells to the distribution
of completed spells is given in Feller (p. 370).
6For a discussion of these surveys see U.S. Department of Labor, Research Monographs
15 and 16; Institute for Social Reserach (University of Michigan).
7Note that this biases downward the standard deviations of tenure in the Michigan
PSID data set.44
14These are based on 525 separations from 1969 to 1970. Comparable estimates
for other years give smaller coefficients on unionism:
bW U·W
A
1970-71 (n = 473) .04(.06)
1971-72 (n = 493) .10(.06)
1972-73 (n = 590) .11(.06)
where n ~ sample size, bWU.W = regression coefficient linking wages on the
A
new job to unionism holding fixed wages on the previous job (and the other
characteristics of the previous job used as controls in table 2).
15
. For detailed discussion of the model see Chamberlain. For detailed discussion
of the application to the union-quit relation see Freeman (1978b).
16
An alternative to the fixed effects model would be a random effects model in
which the person effects would be treated as random variables rather than as
constants. Such a model would provide a weaker test of the selectivity argument.
17
See u.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Collective Bargaining Agreements
Grievance Procedures, ~ulletin 1425-1, table 1, p. 2.45
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